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  Résumé 
Les méthodes de conception dans des systèmes d'in-
formation créent souvent des descriptions de logiciel 
en utilisant des langages formels.  Néanmoins, la plu-
part des concepteurs de logiciel préfèrent décrire le 
logiciel en utilisant des langages naturels.  Cette dis-
tinction n'est pas simplement une question de pragma-
tisme.  Les langages naturels ne sont pas identiques à 
des langages formels; en particulier, langages naturels 
ne suivent pas les notions de l'équivalence employées 
par langages formels.  En cet article, nous montrons 
l'existence et la coexistence de différentes notions de 
l'équivalence en un extension de la notion des oracles 
utilisés dans langages formels.  Ceci permet à des dis-
tinctions d'être faites entre les oracles dignes de 
confiance assumés par des langages formels et les ora-
cles non dignes de la confiance employés par des lan-
gages naturels.  En examinant la notion de l'équiva-
lence, nous espérons encourager les concepteurs de 
logiciel à repenser l'endroit de l'ambiguïté dans la 
conception de logiciel. 
 
Mots clefs: 
Program, logiciel, équivalence, langage formel, lan-
gage naturel. 
 
 
 
 Abstract 
Design methods in information systems frequently 
create software descriptions using formal languages.  
Nonetheless, most software designers prefer to de-
scribe software using natural languages.  This distinc-
tion is not simply a matter of convenience.  Natural 
languages are not the same as formal languages; in 
particular, natural languages do not follow the notions 
of equivalence used by formal languages.  In this pa-
per, we show both the existence and coexistence of 
different notions of equivalence by extending the no-
tion of oracles used in formal languages.  This allows 
distinctions to be made between the trustworthy ora-
cles assumed by formal languages and the untrust-
worthy oracles used by natural languages.  By examin-
ing the notion of equivalence, we hope to encourage 
designers of software to rethink the place of ambiguity 
in software design. 
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Preface 
Language is clearly important as a medium for communi-
cation in software design.  Nonetheless, discussions of 
language in software design have been dominated by 
debates about the role of formal languages.  For over 40 
years, formal languages have been held as the ideal me-
dium for communication software design.  Formal lan-
guages are precise with clear definitions and elegant 
characterisations.  Formal languages then, should be ideal 
for software design (Zemanek H, 1985).  Yet, despite 
over 40 years of argument, an overwhelming majority of 
software design remains heavily reliant on natural lan-
guages.  Why? 
In this paper, we propose that natural languages and for-
mal languages have different, and fundamentally incom-
patible, notions of equivalence.  We accept the notion of 
equivalence used in formal languages is universally ap-
plicable to all program designs, however this does not 
mean the same notion of equivalence is applicable to all 
software designs.  Consequently, while ambiguity must 
be eliminated for descriptions of programs, we will argue 
that ambiguity has a rightful place in software design. 
1. The importance of equivalence 
We begin this paper with a working definition of equiva-
lence: equivalence is simply taken to mean an isomorphic 
relationship between the things on either side of an 
equivalence relationship.  That is to say, that things can 
be mapped between the one side of the relationship and 
the other without changing their meaning.  This notion of 
equivalence will be examined in detail in § 2. 
1.1 Programs or software? 
Although the term's 'software' and 'program' are often 
treated as though they were equivalent, most researchers 
now draw a distinction between 'software design' and 
'program design'.  In the early years, the problems faced 
by designers were focused on the machine, for example, 
describing how a particular calculation should be carried 
out.  All that was needed to solve these problems was to 
work out the exact sequence of instructions, the program, 
which could be fed into a machine.  Thus, program de-
sign is firmly centred on the computer. 
However, as problems became larger designers quickly 
realised that the machine-based focus did not always help 
when it came to solving 'real world' problems.  For ex-
ample, a business might regularly need to know the stock 
levels held in a warehouse.  From the point-of-view of 
the program designers, it does not matter much whether 
the results need to be returned by stock number, level of 
stock, or location of the stock.  However, it does matter 
to the business.  Having to manually re-sort a program 
output by stock number to work out the location of the 
stock can be done, but it significantly reduces the useful-
ness of the program.  Gradually these descriptions of the 
'larger-purposes' of the program became known as soft-
ware.  Thus while software design includes program de-
sign, software designers must look beyond the computer 
for their craft. 
In this paper, we will concentrate on the problem of soft-
ware design.  However, before moving onto problems of 
software design, we need to clarify the meaning of 
certain other terms. 
1.2 Definitions 
As a starting point for our definitions, we begin with a 
recognition that an unperceived universe exists: a uni-
verse beyond the reach of any individual designer.  This 
unperceived universe we will call reality, defined as 
"...that which underlies and is the truth of appearances or 
phenomena" (Simpson J. and Weiner E. 1989).  In com-
mon with other philosophical discussions, the emphasis 
in discussions on reality focused on what really exists, 
rather than the existence perceived by any individual 
designer (Audi R. 1995).  The perceptions of an individ-
ual designer can be important to the success of the soft-
ware design (Sommerville I. and Sawyer P. 1997) as only 
by capturing these viewpoints can a designer fully under-
stand the needs of all the users (Graham T. 1996). 
Thus in software design, in addition to 'unperceived real-
ity' we need a notion of 'perceived reality'; we will call 
this perceived reality the representation.  The representa-
tion can be thought of as the mental model of an individ-
ual designer; characterising their perceived reality.  The 
representation can therefore be defined as "[t]he opera-
tion of the mind in forming a clear image or concept" 
(Simpson J. and Weiner E. 1989). 
However, these mental models are not directly transmis-
sible.  Instead, some intermediate form is needed; a form 
we will call the description.  We will discuss descriptions 
in detail in §2.  For now we will simply define descrip-
tions as "[a] statement which describes, sets forth, or 
portrays'' (Simpson J. and Weiner E. 1989). 
Having presented some working definitions for the terms 
descriptions, representation and reality, we will now be-
gin to define the terms relating these concepts.  We will 
start with the relationship between reality and a represen-
tation.  Essentially, this relationship characterises the 
representation as the result of the reception of stimuli 
from reality.  Following Charles Meadow and Weijing 
Yuan (1997), we will refer to this as information.  By 
contrast, the formation of a description from a representa-
tion is a conscious act by the designer who knowingly 
chooses the form of the description.  We will therefore 
refer to this relationship as knowledge.  All five terms are 
briefly summarised pictorially in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 - Summary of Definitions and Terms 
1.3 Equivalence in software design 
Although researchers in software design have often used 
programming theory as an inspiration for their work, 
programming theory is bound to a strict notion of equiva-
lence.  This formal notion of equivalence conflates sev-
eral more general notions that may otherwise held to be 
distinct, thus making adequate definitions of some terms 
impossible. 
Within formal theory, the perceptions of an individual 
designer are irrelevant.  Formal theory focuses instead on 
uncovering an objective reality: one untainted by the 
views of the individual.  Consequently, formal theory 
cannot naturally distinguish between reality and 
representations.  Formal theory does not permit valid 
representations in an individual mind to diverge from 
reality; any mental models designer has must map seam-
lessly onto a larger reality. 
Likewise, for formal theory any valid description must 
have a seamless, isomorphic, mapping to the representa-
tion.  Consequently, there must be some way of exactly 
characterising any individual designer's representation.  
Without this constraint, forming descriptions with unam-
biguous meanings is impossible. 
This means a formal theory can deal with written descrip-
tions of reality, as the assumption is that the written de-
scription, the mental representation and the underlying 
reality are all equivalent.  Thus, formal theory makes no 
practical distinction between the concepts of description, 
representation and reality. 
In program design, the advantages of formal theories 
heavily outweigh the disadvantages of not being able to 
make a distinction between description, representation or 
reality.  However, for software design, the reverse is true; 
software designers often need to make such distinctions. 
1.4 Equivalence and Epistemology 
Traditionally, the ascendance of formal theory has meant 
software designers borrowed extensively from rationalist 
epistemological arguments.  Broadly, for the rationalist 
epistemological position, "reason is the source of all 
knowledge".  Hence, "[i]f reason is the source of all 
knowledge, then everything that can be known including 
the natural world must be intelligible and rationally ex-
plicable" (Jack A. 1993).  Formal equivalence is impor-
tant to rationalist arguments because of the emphasis on 
objective truth.  Once an objective truth has been found, 
then other equivalent truths must also be true.  Conse-
quently, a few truths and a network of equivalence argu-
ments can be used to construct detailed descriptions. 
Thus, using a formal notion of equivalence strongly fa-
vours the use of rationalist arguments.  However, moving 
from the formal to other notions of equivalence allows 
software designers to consider other epistemological po-
sitions.  For example, as we will see in §4, object-
oriented software design methods need a notion of 
"equivalent until further notice".  Such a notion is diffi-
cult to construct using rationalist arguments but is natural 
in another style of epistemological argument: empiricism.  
The empiricist school argues that knowledge is the result 
of observation and experience.  Thus, an empiricist 
would expect a notion of truth to be along the lines of 
"experienced to be true" or "observed to be true".  This 
need not be an eternal truth; empiricist arguments are 
responsive to truths that change in the light of experience. 
The difficulty of establishing eternal truths using empiri-
cist arguments means that formal notions of equivalence 
cannot be used.  This lack of a formal notion of equiva-
lence has led researchers to find ways of treating design 
methods more naturally inclined to empiricism (such as 
object-oriented design) in a purely rationalist manner. 
By extending the notion of equivalence, we hope to en-
courage software designers to consider other epistemo-
logical arguments that may form a more approriate foun-
dation for their work than rationalist ones.  We will begin 
by examining other notions of equivalence such as those 
that exist in natural languages before moving onto a more 
detailed definition of equivalence in §2.2. 
2. Equivalence in software 
2.1 Equivalence in natural languages 
For many researchers in Information Systems, the key 
attraction of formal languages is that they are unambigu-
ous.  All formal languages are capable of creating crisp, 
elegant descriptions with properties chosen by the lan-
guage designer.  However, the crispness and elegance of 
formal languages has prejudiced many software design 
methods against ambiguity.  Ambiguity in descriptions of 
software design is seen as detrimental to the ability of the 
description to communicate the intent of the designer.  In 
arguing for a more general notion of equivalence, we are 
arguing for the retention of ambiguity in descriptions of 
software. 
We will begin our examination of equivalence by explor-
ing two components of language: written descriptions and 
spoken descriptions.  Although in a formal language writ-
ten and spoken descriptions would be synonymous, this 
is not the case for natural languages.  For natural lan-
guages (Bloomfield L. 1935, pp. 21): 
"Writing is not language, but merely a way of recording 
language by means of visible marks ..." 
Description Representation Reality
Knowledge Information
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Natural languages can be used to communicate without 
first needing to create a fixed and immutable set of rules.  
Instead, spoken and written descriptions evolve inde-
pendently.  Yet, despite the independent evolution of 
written and spoken forms of language, some relationship 
between the two is preserved.  We contend this ability is 
given by a more general notion of equivalence than the 
one accepted by formal languages. 
Natural languages need to retain their ambiguity because 
their component descriptions are not underpinned by a 
single set of rules.  Instead, the components of the lan-
guage change at different rates as the language changes.  
In contrast, the components of formal languages cannot 
change independently because the rules governing the 
language cannot change.  Change in formal languages 
therefore creates new languages whereas in natural lan-
guages the history of change becomes part of the lan-
guage itself. 
2.2 What is equivalence? 
Having highlighted these differences between natural and 
formal languages, we now return to the question "what is 
equivalence?"  According to the Oxford English Diction-
ary, equivalence means (Simpson J. and Weiner E. 
1989): 
"Equal in value.  Now only in more restricted uses: (a) of 
things regarded as mutually compensating each other, or 
as exchangeable" 
The key notion here is of exchangeability.  For descrip-
tions, this means that equivalent descriptions can be ex-
changed without affecting the sense of either description, 
that is we could say that two descriptions are equivalent 
if they both appeal to the same mental model, as shown 
in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 - A naïve view of equivalence 
By appealing to the same mental model, two descriptions 
ought to appeal to the same meaning.  Either description 
captures the intended meaning, so either description 
could be used to characterise it.  For example, a designer 
ought to have the same mental model for both spoken and 
written descriptions of the same concept.  In this case, the 
spoken and written descriptions are equivalent.  Either 
the spoken or the written description could be used with-
out affecting the meaning of the description. 
However, we noted previously that representations are 
not directly transmissible.  This creates a problem: we 
cannot guarantee the mental model used by the designer 
is the same for both written descriptions and spoken de-
scriptions.  Without a direct means of examining the rep-
resentation, we cannot establish the substance (or even 
the number) of mental models used by the designer. 
In essence, then, descriptions appeal to representations 
for meaning.  Let us now examine this appeal in more 
detail.  The first step is that a description claims to char-
acterise some feature of the representation.  If this claim 
is upheld, we can move onto the next stage: comparing 
the representations.  If the representations compare, we 
can then deduce that, since the two claims are valid, the 
two descriptions must be equivalent.  The problem for the 
naïve view of equivalence in Figure 2 is that without 
being able to directly compare representations, we cannot 
complete the second stage of the appeal. 
Nonetheless, we cannot even reach the second stage 
without first being able to verify the claim of a descrip-
tion to characterise the representation.  Let us therefore 
put an oracle between a description and the representa-
tion.  The task of this oracle is simply to adjudicate on 
the claim "This description means …". 
Ignoring the details of the oracle, and assuming the repre-
sentation as the input, our problems at the first stage of 
the appeal are then twofold.  Firstly, how do know that 
the oracle always refers to the same mental model when 
answering a question?  Without a guarantee that a de-
scription always points to the same mental model, we 
have no guarantee that the meaning is preserved and, 
without this, we have no guarantee that two descriptions 
are equivalent.  Secondly, even assuming the oracle is 
always using the same mental model, how do we know 
the answers the oracles provide are repeatable?  Equiva-
lent descriptions should always be exchangeable, if not 
we might run into the situation where two descriptions 
are exchangeable one moment but not exchangeable at 
some later point. 
However, although these are difficult problems, both will 
only occur if we insist the oracle is trustworthy, that is 
(1) the oracle must always give the same output given the 
same input, and (2) the oracle must divulge what that 
input was in order to be able to demonstrate its trustwor-
thiness.  We will return to the consequences of these 
conditions in §3.  For the moment, we will consider un-
trustworthy oracles further. 
Untrustworthy oracles are almost the reverse of trustwor-
thy ones.  Firstly, untrustworthy oracles may give differ-
ent outputs for the same inputs.  Secondly, untrustworthy 
oracles do not state what their inputs are - only the out-
puts.  Untrustworthy oracles can answer the question 
"This description means …", however, the questioner 
will not know the grounds on which the question is an-
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swered nor will they know if they would get the same 
answer again for the same input. 
We can now use this notion of an untrustworthy oracle to 
describe a more general notion of equivalence.  To do 
this we will insert an untrustworthy oracle between the 
description and the representation, as shown in Figure 3.  
As before, the oracle will adjudicate on the question 
"This description means …". 
Figure 3 - A rigorous foundation for equivalence 
Each description has its own untrustworthy oracle.  In 
Figure 3 the written description, D1 has the untrustworthy 
oracle O1 and the spoken description D2 has the untrust-
worthy oracle O2.  Given that both O1 and O2 are untrust-
worthy, we can ignore the representation (i.e. the input), 
leaving Figure 4. 
Figure 4 - Focusing on the description 
This then leaves two descriptions with two untrustworthy 
oracles, giving a general scheme that can be used as the 
foundation of a theory of equivalence.  Rather than de-
tailing this scheme here, the next two sections will con-
centrate on four specific cases that are directly applicable 
to current approaches to software design.  The details of 
the application of this theory to software design can be 
found in the accompanying paper, King D. and Kimble 
C. (2004) 
3. Equivalence in Rationalist  
Arguments 
Rationalist arguments concentrate on demonstrations of 
truth.  In rationalist arguments it is not enough to claim 
truth: truth must be shown by some means.  The require-
ment for demonstration in rationalist approaches favours 
an emphasis on the description, or more usually on sys-
tems of descriptions.  A system is simply a founding the-
ory, from which other descriptions can be created.  The 
ideal for rationalist approaches is self-describing systems.  
Self-describing systems are closed, so the system not 
only describes a truth in descriptions, but also describes 
what truth is and how it can be recognised.  As the rules 
of the system governing exchanges are fixed, or immuta-
ble, we can therefore claim that if two descriptions are 
equivalent by the conventions of the system, they are 
immutability equivalent.  In this paper, we denote immu-
table equivalence using the symbol '≡ .'  We can now 
represent an immutable equivalence between written and 
spoken descriptions as shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5 - Immutably equivalent descriptions 
However, closed systems are rare and usually also quite 
trivial (Claude C. and Paun G. 2000).  More often, such 
systems either end up containing descriptions that are 
both simultaneously true and false; or descriptions whose 
truth cannot be proved.  Demonstrating the presence of 
an immutable equivalence between two descriptions ther-
efore requires an appeal to something beyond the system.  
Usually these appeals are to self-evident truths, or axi-
oms, that can be accepted as true without debate.  Given 
a set of axioms, other truths can then be constructed 
within the system. 
For example, we could create an axiom stating, "This 
description is provable …" using two related systems of 
descriptions, such as logic and a sub-set of number the-
ory.  Within each system, we can create an exact defini-
tion of what we mean by "This description is provable 
…".  In the system of logic, we could use Alan Turing’s 
mathematical machines and in number theory, we could 
use Alonzo Church’s recursive functions.  Neither of 
these systems is perfectly closed, but both have an exact 
definition of what we mean by the statement “This de-
scription is provable …”.  Further, because the two sys-
tems are related, we can create descriptions in one system 
having an exact analogue in the other.  For example, Tur-
ing machines (logic) have an exact analogue using 
Church’s recursive functions  (number theory).  We now 
have two systems, each containing the axiom “This de-
scription is provable…” along with a precise meaning.  
Further, we can translate descriptions between the two 
systems because the two systems are related.  Therefore, 
instead of arguing over whether the axiom “This descrip-
tion is provable…” in logic is exactly the same as the 
axiom “This description is provable…” in number theory, 
we simply define the two axioms to be equivalent.  This 
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allows the creation of immutable descriptions in the re-
lated systems, as long as the oracles attesting to the truth 
of the founding axioms are trustworthy. 
Using the symbol ‘’ for trustworthy oracles, these con-
clusions are shown in Figure 6.  By following this series 
of assumptions, systems that are almost completely 
closed can be created.  These systems are more usually 
known as formal systems. 
Figure 6 - A Formal Notion of Equivalence 
However, the formal style of reasoning only works when 
the oracles can be assumed trustworthy as, without trust-
worthy oracles, immutable equivalences within the sys-
tem might fail to hold outside the system. 
The possibility of untrustworthy oracles poses many 
problems in software design.  In many software designs, 
simply assuming properties of the description are also 
properties of reality (or the representation) is sometimes a 
step to far.  Michael Jackson gives the following example 
taken from the design of an aircraft control system (Jack-
son M. 1996). 
One requirement of this system was: 
REVERSE_ENABLED if and only if MOVING_ON_RUNWAY 
The designers concluded that the following axioms held: 
WHEEL_PULSES_ON if and only if WHEELS_TURNING 
WHEELS_TURNING if and only if MOVING_ON_RUNWAY 
Thus, the designers concluded that the following immu-
table equivalence held: 
WHEEL_PULSES_ON if and only if MOVING_ON_RUNWAY 
In making this conclusion, the designers assumed that an 
immutable equivalence in the description also held for 
things outside the description.  If the designers had access 
to a trustworthy oracle, they could be sure that this 
equivalence actually did hold: unfortunately, they did 
not.  Instead, they had to rely on their own experience (an 
untrustworthy oracle) to judge whether the axioms al-
ways characterised the domain in question. 
In this case, the designers experience proved inadequate, 
they did not realise that if the wheels aquaplaned on a 
wet runway, MOVING_ON_RUNWAY held but 
WHEELS_TURNING did not.  Although the developers could 
form an immutable description inside the description, 
without a trustworthy oracle, they could not guarantee 
that it held outside. 
The situations faced by the designers in this example are 
common and are often tackled by semi-formal methods 
of software design.  Semi-formal design methods allow 
for the formation of immutable equivalence between de-
scriptions, but the designers have to be aware that these 
equivalences are based on untrustworthy oracles.  Conse-
quently semi-formal methods of design must employ 
some means of checking whether the immutable equiva-
lence between descriptions hold outside the description. 
Using the symbol ‘{’ to represent untrustworthy oracles, 
we can now redraw Figure 6 as shown in Figure 7.  This 
forms a new notion of equivalence, held by all semi-
formal methods of software design.  Note that in Figure 7 
no immutable equivalence between the two oracles can 
be assumed, because both oracles are untrustworthy. 
Figure 7 - Semi-Formal Notion of Equivalence 
Having now examined two approaches to software devel-
opment based on rationalist epistemological arguments, 
we will turn to two approaches to software development 
based on empiricist arguments. 
4. Equivalence in Empiricist  
Arguments 
Basing the conclusion of the design methods on untrust-
worthy oracles presents semi-formal design methods with 
something of a problem.  No semi-formal method can 
guarantee that properties claimed from the description 
hold in the real world.  Consequently, although semi-
formal design methods such as structured design were 
popular in the early days of software design, more recent 
design methods have attempted to infer properties of the 
description from reality, rather than trying to infer prop-
erties of reality from the description.  In essence, these 
are design methods based on an empiricist epistemologi-
cal position. 
From an empirical viewpoint, an appeal to experience 
can be used as an external check on any claim; the immu-
tability of our set rules can always be checked against 
reality.  We could therefore argue that experience forms 
the foundations of a trustworthy oracle.  As long as de-
scriptions are carefully constructed from the demon-
strated experience of designers, there should be no doubt 
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over the claims of any individual description to charac-
terise reality. 
This approach leaves us with a problem.  By working 
from reality, we cannot form immutable equivalencies 
between descriptions, as the final proof of equivalence 
lies not in the properties of the description, but in the 
properties of reality.  Hence, the truth of any claimed 
equivalence can only be based on previous experience.  
While two descriptions may be equivalent from previous 
experience, there is no guarantee that some future experi-
ence will not invalidate rules forming the description. 
This is exactly the problem faced by object-oriented 
software design methods, which all choose to argue from 
the experience of reality.  Object-oriented design meth-
ods assume trustworthy oracles, using reality as the final 
arbitrator of claims made by descriptions.  An immutable 
set of equivalences therefore exists between all things in 
reality.  However, even if the oracles are trustworthy, the 
existence of immutable rules for reality does not prevent 
the future experience of designers from having to change 
the description, as illustrated by the previous example. 
As we noted in §1.4 equivalencies in object-oriented 
designs are in the form of "equivalent until further no-
tice".  We will call this form of equivalence mutable 
equivalence, because no systematic conventions can be 
formed using only the properties of the description.  The 
rules governing exchangeability for mutable equivalences 
are not guaranteed: a mutable equivalence may hold at 
one point in time but not another. 
We represent the concept of mutable equivalence using 
the symbol ‘©≡ ’.  Since object-oriented design methods 
assume the presence of trustworthy oracles, the notion of 
equivalence assumed by these methods can be shown in 
Figure 8. 
Figure 8 - The Object-Oriented Notion of Equivalence 
In the preface, we said that we would argue that ambigu-
ity has a rightful place in software design: using mutable 
equivalence with trustworthy oracles is about as far as 
most software design methods have gone.  Nonetheless, 
some design methods have questioned the assumption of 
trustworthy oracles.  Object-oriented design methods 
assume that, because reality is independent of the experi-
ence of any individual designer, a trustworthy oracle (an 
appeal to an objective observer) must exist.  However, 
does everybody share the same experience of reality? 
A few software design methods, such as Peter Check-
land’s soft systems methodology, focus the problems of 
reaching a consensus on, for example, who or what a 
'user' might be or what a 'payroll system' is and what it 
might do.  These methods argue that far from assuming 
all designers think alike, a design method must take into 
account the individual prejudices, experience and inclina-
tions of the participants (Checkland P. 1981). 
However, removing reality as an external arbitrator also 
removes the assumption that trustworthy oracles underpin 
a description; now we must assume that all equivalencies 
are mutable and all assumptions are open to challenge.  
This fluid notion of equivalence is used in what we have 
called holistic design methods.  Unlike object-oriented 
methods, equivalencies are open to challenge not only 
from future experience, but from past and current experi-
ence as well.  Substituting untrustworthy oracles for the 
trustworthy oracles in Figure 8 produces Figure 9 show-
ing the notion of equivalence used in holistic design 
methods. 
Figure 9 - The Holistic Notion of Equivalence 
5. Conclusion 
Traditionally, most software design methods have drawn 
inspiration from program design.  However, methods of 
program design are underpinned by a systematic theory 
capable of characterising every valid description forming 
a program.  This theory is so well formed that, for all 
practical purposes, the assumptions made by its founding 
axioms are irrelevant for most program designs.  How-
ever, once we move beyond the program in a machine, 
the questions around its founding axioms move sharply 
back into focus.  Software design does not have a sys-
tematic theory for characterising every possible software 
description.  This calls into question two key assumptions 
used by formal theories in defending equivalencies. 
The first is assumption is that axioms (descriptions) are 
formed though the actions of a trustworthy oracle.  With 
a trustworthy oracle, the relationship between a descrip-
tion and either the representation or reality is maintained.  
Experience in software design has shown that this as-
sumption cannot always be defended.  Often establishing 
the relationship between the description and the represen-
tation (or the representation and reality) is a major prob-
lem for software designers.  Even if a relationship has 
been found, it is often open to challenge; software design 
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methods must be capable of dealing with its untrust-
worthy oracles. 
The second assumption made by formal theories is that 
by using an established body of theory we can defend 
immutable equivalences between descriptions.  However, 
software has no all-encompassing body of theory.  In-
stead, equivalencies must often be defended from experi-
ence rather than theory.  Equivalence defended from ex-
perience we have called mutable equivalence, and some 
software design methods must be prepared to use this 
form of equivalence. 
Evidence from recent empirical studies (King D. and 
Kimble C. 2004) suggests that no one form of equiva-
lence is universally suited to all software designs.  Fur-
ther, this evidence suggests that even within a single soft-
ware design process, the notion of equivalence used by 
software designers changes. 
Based on these observations and the arguments presented 
in this paper, we reject any attempt to create a unified 
theory of software design and instead advocate a move 
towards using 'ad hoc' theories of software design.  Here 
we use the term ad hoc to signify “devoted, appointed to 
or for some particular purpose” (Simpson J. and Weiner 
E. 1989).  We believe that each notion of equivalence 
represents the core assumption of a particular school of 
software design.  Arguments in software design must 
now move away from discussions of which school is 
right and instead each school should concentrate on pro-
ducing evidence outlining where a particular notion of 
equivalence is, and is not, most appropriate. 
Such discussions are unlikely to produce clear, unambi-
guous conclusions.  Nonetheless, human designers are 
naturally good at coping with ambiguity.  Let us there-
fore turn this ability into a strength instead of condemn-
ing it as a weakness. 
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